A test of a suspicion, not an accusation
Some people report that a domain name they searched for on a registrar's website was registered by someone else shortly afterwards — a practice known as "domain front running". Anecdotes can't be told apart from coincidence. This project measures it.
The question
If you search for an unregistered domain name (or add it to your cart) on a registrar's website, is that name more likely to be registered by a third party in the following weeks than a comparable name nobody searched for?
What this project does
Generates names monthly
On the 1st: brand-like names, not registered (confirmed with the registry, not a registrar), randomly assigned to groups. Every candidate is published.
Searches like a visitor
One short search session a day in a real browser. Some names are also added to a cart — never bought. Controls are never searched.
Publishes everything
Daily registry checks, the raw data, the code and the method — whatever the result is.
What it can and can't show
Can show
- Whether names in one group are registered noticeably more often than control names.
- How long after the search it happened.
- Whether the pattern is specific to one registrar or appears everywhere.
Can't show
- Who registered a name, or why.
- That anyone at a registrar acted deliberately.
- That the leak isn't elsewhere: a browser extension, a network or DNS provider, a shared tool. Comparing registrars with each other and with the control reduces that risk.
A small, mixed or negative result is a valid result, and will be published just as prominently.
Who is behind this
[Your name or handle], an independent individual with no affiliation with, or compensation from, any registrar or competitor. Corrections and replies from registrars are welcome and will be added unedited: [you@example.org].
Open by default
Source code: [https://github.com/you/frontrunning]. Data: domains, search log, registry checks.